Research

Gossip -- broadly conceived of as communication about absent third parties -- may be the basis for a naturally occurring reputation system. That is, everyday gossip is likely to be the main way that group members collect, curate, and circulate information about one another. It may also, therefore, serve the fundamental reputational function of strategic prediction. In this chapter, we draw on game theory to examine how gossip about who a target is and what they have done can help audiences to predict what they are likely to do in strategic situations. We then argue that gossiping itself can be understood through a game theory lens as a cheap talk game. Our analysis reveals that gossipers whose incentives are misaligned with those of their audience may try to exploit the predictive value of gossip. We identify important avenues for future work by shining a light on underexplored strategic situations and highlighting the predictive value of gossip.

The possibility that gossipers may share dishonest reputational information is a key challenge to claims that gossip can shore up cooperation in social groups. It has been suggested that imposing social costs on dishonest gossipers should increase the honesty of these reputational signals. However, at present, there is little evidence of people's willingness to impose costs on dishonest gossipers; there is also little evidence of their ability to detect gossipers' lies in the first place. This paper aims to shed light on people's abilities to detect dishonest gossip and their treatment of those who share it. To do this, we report the results of two trust game studies using the strategy method (study 1) and repeated interactions in the laboratory (study 2). We show that in an environment where gossipers tell spontaneous lies people are more inclined to believe honest than dishonest gossip. We also show that people are more likely to treat favourably gossipers they believe to be honest, but that this does not always result in more favourable treatment for gossipers who were actually honest. We discuss the implications for the potential utility of social sanctions as a tool for securing honesty.

It is widely assumed that people will share inaccurate gossip for their own selfish purposes. This assumption, if true, presents a challenge to the growing body of work that argues that gossip is a ready source of accurate reputational information and therefore is welfare improving. We test this inaccuracy assumption by examining the frequency and form of spontaneous lies shared between gossiping members of networks playing a series of one-shot trust games (N=320). We manipulate whether gossipers are or are not competing with each other. We show that lies make up a sizeable minority of messages, and are twice as frequent under gossiper competition. However, this has no discernible effect on trust levels. We attribute this to the finding that, one, gossip targets are insensitive to lies, and two, some lies are welfare enhancing. These findings suggest that lies need not prevent -- and may help -- gossip to serve reputational functions.

The fact that gossip can be inaccurate, intentionally or otherwise, has led to questions over its ability to build cooperation in large societies. We explore the impact of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized, two-player trust games. We observed non-trivial levels of spontaneous inaccuracy in gossip, and there was evidence that this was largely due to gossipers' desire to punish untrustworthy players. Although this endogenous inaccuracy did not adversely affect levels of trust and trustworthiness, introducing high levels of exogenous inaccuracy did. Importantly though, we observed greater trust and trustworthiness when highly inaccurate gossip was present than when communication was impossible. This suggests that even inaccurate gossip induces a degree of reputational concern in gossip targets and some willingness among gossip recipients to discriminate between partners on the basis of the gossip they received. Thus, gossip need not be perfectly accurate to effectively induce cooperation.

Across two studies, we examine the role of transparency and peer punishment in promoting cooperation and addressing economic inequality in public good contributions. With global inequality rising and the wealthiest few amassing a greater share of resources, its impact on social cohesion and business environments is increasingly significant. Financial secrecy further compounds these issues by allowing for income and wealth concealment at both societal and organizational levels. Our experimental findings reveal that transparency paired with peer punishment significantly boosts cooperation, particularly among advantaged individuals. In contrast, peer punishment alone proves insufficient to mitigate the adverse effects of inequality without the support of transparency. These results underscore the need for ethical governance structures that incorporate transparency, fairness, and accountability -- principles essential for organizations committed to fostering trust and social responsibility in unequal settings.

Policy makers often implement laws or mandates to attempt to change people’s behavior. Such policies act not only as deterrents, but also as societal signposts for what is considered morally right and wrong within a society. In this paper we argue that the presence of laws and mandates may be associated with citizens’ inclination to engage in social norm enforcement within their own network. We studied this using four different datasets in different settings (text-and-drive laws, influenza vaccination mandates, speed limit laws, and COVID-19 mask mandates), in three different countries (total N = 3,156). In all datasets, we found associations between mandates or laws and the inclination to socially confront norm violators. This is in line with our theorizing that mandates and laws may help to increase citizens’ inclination to engage in social norm enforcement, and to foster interpersonal policing of behavior, inviting future research to establish more direct causal conclusions in this regard.

Is the phenomenon of people overestimating their skill relative to their peers (overplacement) exacerbated by group affiliation? Social identity theory predicts people evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members, and we hypothesized that this differential treatment may result in greater overplacement when interacting with an out-group member. We tested this hypothesis with 301 US voters affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic party in the run-up to the 2020 Presidential election, a time when political identities were salient and highly polarized. We found there is a higher tendency for overplacement when faced with an out-group opponent than with an in-group opponent. Decomposition analysis suggests this difference is due to underestimating the opponent, as opposed to overestimating one's own performance to a higher degree. Moreover, any tendency to incur in overplacement is mitigated when faced with an opponent with the same political identity relative to one with a neutral one. Group affiliation biases initial priors, but not how they are updated.

Financial incentives and information nudges are two of the most widely used behaviour change interventions. However, we do not yet fully understand how incentives and social information interact. We report two experiments examining how incentives and social information interact to induce behavior change. In the first experiment, the behavior of interest is punctuality in the field; in the second, we examine cooperation in a large-N prisoners' dilemma in the lab. In both experiments participants valued good behavior and believed others also valued it, yet only a minority behaved well. We find that incentives work in both environments, while information nudges were only effective in the prisoners' dilemma. Incentives complement information nudges only in the prisoners' dilemma. Our experimental design also allows us to distinguish between intrinsically motivated and unmotivated subjects: the former respond to treatment manipulations very differently to the latter, both behaviourally and in their beliefs about others' behavior.

We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on other-regarding preferences. We report on a series of two-player binary Dictator experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Both Muslims' and Hindus' aversion to advantageous inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member increases. We find no evidence of aversion to disadvantageous inequality on either religious sample. Both Muslim and Hindu participants display aversion to advantageous inequality in both fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of village fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across religious groups.

We study using laboratory experiments the impact on cooperation of allowing individuals to invest in group-specific, excludable public goods. We find that allowing different social groups to voluntarily contribute to such goods increases total contributions. However, a significant proportion of that contribution goes toward the group-specific club good rather than the public good, even when the latter has higher financial returns to cooperation. We find significant evidence of in-group biases, which are manifested by positive in-group reciprocity. That is, club goods allow subjects to display their preferences for interaction with their in-group members, as well as positive in-group reciprocity.

We study the role of village-level religious fragmentation on intra- and inter-group cooperation in India. We report on data on two-player prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt experiments played by 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of village-level religious heterogeneity. In religiously heterogeneous villages, cooperation rates in the prisoners' dilemma, and to a lesser extent the stag hunt game, are higher when subjects of either religion play with a fellow in-group member than when they play with an out-group member or with someone whose identity is unknown. Interestingly, cooperation rates among people of the same religion are significantly lower in homogeneous villages than in fragmented villages in both games.

We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on behavior in Tullock contests. We report on a series of two-player Tullock contest experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Our main finding is that the effect of social identity is small and inconsistent across the two religious groups in our study. While we find small but statistically significant results in line with our hypotheses in the Hindu sample, we find no statistically significant effects in the Muslim sample. This is in contrast to evidence from Chakravarty et al. (2016), who report significant differences in cooperation levels in prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games, both in terms of village composition and identity. We attribute this to the fact that social identity may have a more powerful effect on cooperation than on conflict.

We study the role of social identity in determining the impact of social fragmentation on public good provision using laboratory experiments. We find that as long as there is some degree of social fragmentation, increasing it leads to lower public good provision by majority group members. This is mainly because the share of those in the majority group who contribute fully to the public good diminishes with social fragmentation, while the share of free-riders is unchanged. This suggests social identity preferences drive our result, as opposed to self-interest. Importantly, we find no difference in contribution between homogeneous and maximally-fragmented treatments, reinforcing our finding that majority groups contribute most in the presence of some diversity.

Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants' subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants' punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.

We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers' labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholders for a given legal regime, as well as the probability of managers forming explicit cartels and coordinating on prices in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly, taking contract and legal regime as given. Our results suggest that there is less collusion when the legal regime prosecutes managers. High-powered contracts do not incentivize cartel formation or price coordination effectively, irrespective of legal regime. Nevertheless, high-powered contracts were most frequently chosen by shareholders, often with collusive intents.

We consider auctions where bidders’ valuations are positively correlated with their productivity in a second-stage aftermarket. We test in the lab whether bidders recognize the opportunity to signal their productivity through their bidding and, conditional on them doing so, whether disclosing different information about the auction outcomes affects their signaling behavior. Our results confirm that bidders recognize the signaling opportunities they face and also react to differences in the way their bidding behavior is disclosed, although not always in a way that is consistent with theoretical predictions.

This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader-follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.

Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra-competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n-firm Cournot experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments with-out the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate.

This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all-pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid-level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses.

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.

We conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand–Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect competition). Controlling for the number of firms, higher production capacity leads to lower prices. However, the decline in prices as industry capacity rises is less pronounced than predicted by Nash equilibrium, and a model of myopic price adjustments has greater predictive power. With higher capacities, Edgeworth-cycle behavior becomes less pronounced, causing lower prices. Evidence for tacit collusion is limited and restricted to low-capacity duopolies.

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.

Contest theory has been used in Industrial Organization to describe phenomena like R&D races, or efforts to defend a monopoly position. When pricing behavior is constrained by regulators, competition can also take the form of a contest. This paper reports on an experimental test of the effects of asymmetry in the Tullock contest success function. Both the simultaneous-move and sequential-move frameworks are considered. Despite high levels of overbidding across the different conditions, the introduction of asymmetries in the contest function generates experimental behavior on aggregate qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions. At the individual level, behavior seems divided into those subjects who bid very high amounts and those who bid very low amounts.

We analyze the impact of mergers in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies. Treatment variables are the number of firms (two, three) and the distribution of industry capacity (symmetric, asymmetric). Consistent with a dynamic collusion model, we find that, even though they are more concentrated, asymmetric markets exhibit lower prices than symmetric markets with the same number of firms. Consistent with the static Nash prediction, duopolies charge higher prices than triopolies when we control for (a)symmetry. The overall impact of a merger (which comprises both fewer firms and an asymmetry) is anti-competitive but the price increase is not significant.

In this paper we experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with an extended timing game. The timing game has observable delay, that is, firms announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in the first period. With random matching we find that, given the actual experimental behavior in the subgames, subjects play a timing game more akin to a coordination game with two symmetric equilibria rather than the predicted game with a dominant strategy to produce early. As a result, a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.

In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.

We examine the effect of cash windfalls on the supply of effort and tax compliance in a high stakes, real effort laboratory experiment. Income windfalls have a negative effect on effort, which mirrors existing evidence from the field. Tax compliance on labor income is only marginally affected by windfalls. When windfall income is taxable, we find a positive relationship between windfall size and compliance. We find no evidence that taxpayers switch from one type of evasion to the other as a function of whether windfalls are taxable or not. While compliance levels are lowest among the most productive, there are no differential effects of windfalls on compliance along the productivity dimension.

We study, using laboratory experiments, the extent to which disclosure policies about the financial health of a bank affect the likelihood of a bank run. We consider two disclosure regimes, full disclosure and no disclosure, under two scenarios: one in which the bank is on average financially solvent and another in which the bank is on average insolvent. When the bank is on average insolvent, the full disclosure regime reduces the expected likelihood of runs. In contrast, when the bank is on average solvent, the full disclosure regime increases the expected likelihood of runs. We also find that disclosing identical information when depositors' expectations are low versus high (good versus bad news) leads to behavioural differences only indirectly through their beliefs about the other depositor's actions. Our findings show that instituting a policy of greater banking transparency is not always beneficial.

To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties' taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads.

Defaults, in the form of prepopulated fields within the tax form, have been identified as potential mechanisms that tax authorities can use to reduce noncompliance. They achieve this by simplifying the process of filing taxes, thus reducing the scope for errors. However, defaults may increase the scope for evasion if set incorrectly. The authors report experimental data on the effect of correct and incorrect defaults. They find that prepopulating tax returns is a worthwhile policy only if it is done with highly reliable information. Setting default levels that underestimate taxpayers' true tax liability leads to significant drops in compliance and tax revenue. The authors also study whether nudges that contain messages with descriptive norms about compliance can mitigate the adverse effect of prepopulated returns with incorrect values. Nudges that react to inputs from the taxpayer effectively raise compliance, whereas static nudges do not. This result demonstrates the limits to the applicability of nudges in a public policy sphere as well as possible adverse effects resulting from poor implementation.

We report on data from a real-effort tax compliance experiment using three subject pools: students, who do not pay income tax; company employees, whose income is reported by their employer; and self-employed taxpayers, who are responsible for filing and payment. While compliance behavior is unaffected by changes in the level of, or information about the audit probability, higher fines increase compliance. We find subject pool differences: self-assessed taxpayers are the most compliant, while students are the least compliant. Through a simple framing manipulation, we show that such differences are driven by norms of compliance from outside the lab.

To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond-Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks' liquidity levels are either linked or independent. Left Bank depositors see their bank's liquidity level before deciding. Right Bank depositors only see Left Bank withdrawals before deciding. We find that Left Bank depositors' actions significantly affect Right Bank depositors' behavior, even when liquidities are independent. Furthermore, a panic may be a one-way street: an increase in Left Bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the Right Bank, but a decrease does not calm depositors.

Environmental uncertainty is at the core of much of human activity, ranging from daily decisions by individuals to long-term policy planning by governments. Yet, there is little quantitative evidence on the ability of non-expert individuals or populations to forecast climate-related events. Here we report on data from a 90-year old prediction game on a climate related event in Alaska: the Nenana Ice Classic (NIC). Participants in this contest guess to the nearest minute when theice covering the Tanana River will break, signaling the start of spring. Previous research indicates a strong correlation between the ice breakup datesand regional weather conditions. We study betting decisions between 1955 and 2009. We find the betting distribution closely predicts the outcome of the contest. We also find a significant correlation between regional temperatures as well as past ice breakups and betting behavior, suggesting that participants incorporate both climate and historical information into their decision-making.

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex-ante queues (pre-decision) to an ex-post spot market (post-decision & post-rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

In labour markets, women are often underrepresented relative to men. This underrepresentation may be due to inaccurate beliefs about ability across genders. Inaccurate beliefs might cause a sampling problem: to have accurate beliefs about a group, one must first collect information about it. However, employers may not wish to shortlist individuals from a group that is perceived to exhibit lower quality. Inaccurate beliefs may also persist due to biased belief updating. We run a stylised hiring experiment to disentangle these two effects. We ask participants to create shortlists from a male and a female pool of workers and give them feedback on the skill of those they shortlist. Based on that information, participants hire workers, and provide us with their beliefs about the distribution of skills in the male and female pots. We study how employers update their beliefs as a function of their past shortlisting behaviour, and how they shortlist given their beliefs. Participants were more likely to sample from the pool with the higher subjective mean quality (on average men) and lower subjective variance. Participants were not Bayesian updaters but there were no gender-specific biases in updating. Sampling more from a pool and spending more time sampling yield more accurate beliefs.

The pay gap between those in leadership positions and other organisational members has risen markedly over the last five decades. There is evidence that this gap may undermine subordinate identification with and evaluation of the organisation and its leaders. To date, however, there is limited evidence that this gap affects related subordinate behaviour, including their willingness to follow their leader's commands and work for the organisational public good. To address this, we ran two pre-registered experiments (Study 1: N = 318; Study 2: N = 327) that examined participants' real effort behaviour in temporary 'organisations' with a small or large leader-worker pay gap. We varied whether this pay gap was exogenously determined (Study 1), or endogenously chosen by the leader (Study 2). In both studies, workers in large (versus small) pay gap organisations were less likely to identify with their leader and organisation and reported poorer affective well-being. They were also less willing, at least initially, to follow their leader's commands. When the size of the pay gap was endogenously chosen by the leader, workers in large (versus small) gap organisations reduced their contributions to the public good. We discuss implications for organisational leadership and performance.

The frequency of hot days in much of the world is increasing. What is the impact of high temperatures on productivity? Can technology-based adaptation mitigate such effects of climate change? We provide some answers to these questions by examining how high outdoor temperatures affect a high-technology, precision manufacturing setting. Exploiting individual-level data on the quantity and quality of work done across 35,190 worker-shifts in a leading NYSE-listed silicon wafer maker in China, we evidence a negative effect of outdoor heat on productivity. The effects are large: in our preferred linear specification, an increase in wet bulb temperature of 10°C causes a reduction in output of 8.3%. Temperature effects exist even though the manufacturer's work-spaces are indoors and protected by high-quality climate control systems. Results are not driven by extreme weather events and are robust to alternative modelling approaches. They illustrate the potential future adverse economic effects of climate change in most of the industrialised world.

The large discrepancy between the pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) and their subordinates within organizations is attracting increasing attention and controversy. While there is evidence that this pay disparity may be contributing to rises in societal income inequality (and thus the range of associated social ills), there is little understanding of the impact of pay disparity on CEOs' abilities to effectively lead their organizations. Drawing on the social identity approach to leadership, we argue that as the pay of CEOs increases relative to their followers, these followers will be less likely to identify with their CEOs as "one of us." This, in turn, should undermine followers' willingness to be influenced by the CEO: to follow their lead. We discuss two recent studies that provide the first test of these claims. These studies provide archival and experimental evidence that high CEO pay reduces followers' identification as well as their perceptions that the CEO is a charismatic identity leader. In sum, then, this work suggests that high CEO pay may directly impair their capacity to perform their core function of leading their organization.

In the present research we report results from two experimental studies that examine how feedback about leadership potential impacts leadership ambition, organizational commitment, and performance. Study 1 used an experimental vignette methodology that controls for prior performance. Results show that individuals who receive feedback that they have low potential to be a future leader have lower ambition and organizational commitment relative to those who receive feedback that they have high potential to be a future leader. Study 2 provides evidence of the causal behavioral effects of feedback about leadership potential using a real task effort environment. Results show that participants informed to be unlikely future leaders display lower performance in a subsequent task than participants informed to be likely future leaders. The findings from the two studies demonstrate that information about leadership potential affects subsequent ambition to become leaders as well as performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the importance of followership, talent management, and leadership succession.

A growing body of evidence indicates that organizational identification underpins a range of important organizational outcomes. However, to date, the literature has provided little empirically grounded guidance for organizations that are trying to develop organizational identification among their employees. In this article, the authors aim to address this lacuna by testing the effectiveness of the ASPIRe (Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources) model-a model that specifies a sequence of structured activities designed to use subgroup identities as a platform for building organizational identification-in a bespoke workshop delivered to senior military health services personnel. As predicted by the ASPIRe model, participants reported increased levels of subgroup and organizational identification as a result of the workshop and were also more supportive of the organization's strategy.

Pursuing replicability --independent evidence for previous claims-- is important for creating generalizable knowledge. Here we attempted replications of 274 claims of positive results from 164 quantitative papers published from 2009 to 2018 in 54 journals in the social and behavioural sciences. Replications were high powered on average to detect the original effect size (median of 99.6%), used original materials when relevant and available, and were peer reviewed in advance through a standardized internal protocol. Replications showed statistically significant results in the original pattern for 151 of 274 claims (55.1% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.2-60.9%)) and for 80.8 of 164 papers (49.3% (95% CI 43.8-54.7%)), weighed for replicating multiple claims per paper. We observed modest variation in replication rates across disciplines (42.5-63.1%), although some estimates had high uncertainty. The median Pearson's r effect size was 0.25 (95% CI 0.21-0.27) for original studies and 0.10 (95% CI 0.09-0.13) for replication studies, an 82.4% (95% CI 67.8-88.2%) reduction in shared variance. Thirteen methods for evaluating replication success provided estimates ranging from 28.6% to 74.8% (median of 49.3%). Some decline in effect size and significance is expected based on power to detect original effects and regression to the mean because we replicated only positive results. We observe that challenges for replicability extend across social-behavioural sciences, illustrating the importance of identifying conditions that promote or inhibit replicability.